Journalists and policy analysts have highlighted the emergence of Brazil as a regional power. However, little attention has been paid to its foreign policy strategies. Brazil's rise to prominence in world politics represents the historical culmination of a foreign policy featuring two main strategies -persuasion and consensus building -both of which emphasise the use of soft power. We analyse four current foreign policy initiatives: the campaign for a permanent seat on the UNSC; the development of a nuclear submarine; Brazil's leadership of the UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti; and government support for Brazilian multinationals. We suggest a growing tension between these initiatives and the two strategies identified above. These initiatives reflect the view current among some policymakers that if Brazil is to rise as a global power it must play by the rules of great power politics.
n the past two decades, and particularly during the administration of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Brazil has been more involved in regional and international issues. Building on strong economic growth over the period, the country has raised its profile, winning the bid to host the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games. Moreover, due to its size and increasing economic clout, Brazil has been identified as a leader in South America, and one of the most substantial players in the Global South (MORAN, 2012; SWEIG, 2011; SWEIG and SPEKTOR, 2011) 1 . Brazil's new prominence in foreign affairs can be understood as the historical culmination of a foreign policy that has traditionally been built around two endeavours: to achieve (i) autonomy and (ii) a significant role in international politics (SARAIVA and VALENÇA, 2011, p.100 ).
These long-term goals, however, have been consistently challenged at different times by the relative weakness of Brazil's hard-power capabilities (HAMANN, 2012a, p. 02; KENKEL, 2013, p. 276) . In the absence of more robust material means, the Brazilian government's main strategies have been directly connected with what, after Joseph Nye (2003 Nye ( , 2004a Nye ( , 2004b , came to be defined as 'soft power', i.e. "the ability to attract and persuade rather than coerce" (NYE, 2003, p. 66) . Soft power works as a complement to hard power and although it may include aspects also identified with forms of economic power, at its core it is based on the attractiveness and legitimacy of a country's culture, political ideals, values, and policies (NYE, 2003, p. 66; NYE, 2004b) . For this reason, Brazilian foreign policy has mainly followed strategies that deploy non-material aspects of power (HAMANN, 2012b, p. 71) : consensus-building initiatives, diplomacy and persuasion. Considering its history, recourse to soft power seems to make sense in view of Brazil's interests, goals and resources. This is not to suggest that Brazil has been unable or unwilling to resort to more traditional forms of hard power, and it has exerted its military power in the past when core national interests have been in jeopardy (HAMANN, 2012b, p. 73) .
Nevertheless, Brazilian policymakers have privileged soft-power strategies in 1 We use the term Global South as it is used by international organisations such as the United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation. It refers broadly to developing states (including, but not limited to the G-77 countries) that share common social, cultural and economic aspects that facilitate South-South Cooperation. For further details, please refer to <http://ssc.undp.org/content/ssc.html>.
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conducting Brazilian foreign policy (BURGES, 2008; VIGEVANI, FAVARON, RAMANZINI and CORREIA, 2008) . Soft power became even more important in the 1990s, when the country reengaged with a range of multilateral forums (BURGES, 2008; CERVO and BUENO, 2008, p. 463; SARAIVA, 2010) in an attempt both to intensify trade and political dialogue with South America and the Global South (KENKEL, 2013) and to gain leverage in dealings with the major powers.
Despite growing awareness of Brazil, particularly in global media outlets, little attention has been paid to the traditional strategies it has used in its foreign policy. Scholars, pundits and policy experts have usually cast Brazilian foreign policy as weak or reluctant, particularly in cases where United States or European public opinion and foreign policy elites demanded or encouraged decisive action to curb human rights violations in politically unstable regions of the globe. Brazil's voting record on the UN Human Rights Council (where it has repeatedly abstained on human rights violations in Iran), its attempt to mediate a nuclear deal between Iran and the United States, and its votes on the Security Council challenging intervention in Libya and elsewhere, are just a few examples (MARIN, 2011; MORAN, 2012; SOTERO, 2011; SWEIG, 2011; SWEIG and SPEKTOR, 2011) .
This narrow perspective has led analysts and commentators to miss the motivations behind Brazilian foreign policy, among them its traditional noninterventionist stance. More importantly, they have also overlooked a recent shift in Brazilian policymakers' understanding of the uses of power, away from the more traditional strategies used in Brazilian foreign policy and towards hard power.
This article begins by explaining the paradigms -Americanism, globalism, pragmatic institutionalism, and autonomism 2 -that have guided Brazilian foreign policy in the past, to explore the role that persuasion and consensus-building have played in Brazil's long-standing emphasis on soft-power discourse. It then discusses four 'new' initiatives that mark the shift away from these foreign-policy traditions. It looks first at Brazil's campaign for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), its development of a nuclear-powered 2 The use of paradigms to frame Brazilian foreign policy is a didactic mechanism designed to categorise and facilitate understanding of its development and main characteristics. The typology presented in this article reflects some of the most recurrent uses and does not constitute a consensus among analysts.
(2014) 8 (3) 66 -94 submarine, its leading role in the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and the use of its publicly-owned development bank (BNDES) to support Brazilian multinational corporations. It concludes by highlighting the growing tension between these initiatives and official Brazilian discourse, which is still reliant on the long-standing traditions and strategies of persuasion and consensus building.
Brazilian foreign policy paradigms
Brazilian foreign policy has traditionally been structured around two main endeavours. The first is to build political and economic autonomy at the international level (PINHEIRO, 2004, p. 07) . The second -closely related to the endeavour to achieve autonomy and originating in a shared understanding in foreign policy circles of Brazil's identity in relation to the world and its Latin
American neighbours -is to find a substantial role in international politics.
Accordingly, one of the main characteristics of Brazil's foreign policy is its relative continuity, despite the socio-economic changes the country has undergone since independence (MALAMUD, 2011a, p.90; SARAIVA, 2010) . This is not to suggest that the different groups in power have always shared the same views on foreign policy, but the disagreements -whether originating from regime change or the circumstances surrounding a given government -have not entailed major change of course nor affected the key themes of foreign policy (SARAIVA and VALENÇA, 2011, p. 100) . 'Relative continuity' means that Brazilian foreign policy has been based on general guidelines and relatively stable understandings of the content of Brazil's national interests. In this sense, its foreign policy can be analysed by way of paradigms, i.e., groups of concepts that highlight certain variables and empirical observations and allow certain behavioural trends to be explained. As a methodological tool for analysing foreign policy strategies, paradigms thus contribute in three ways (CERVO, 2003, pp. 07-08 The Americanist paradigm is considered to be the first systematically manifested in Brazilian foreign policy. It developed mainly in the 1890s during the early years of the Republic in direct counterpoint to the more European-centric stance of the recently-ousted monarchy (SILVA, 1995, pp. 97-103) . The
Americanists -represented by key figures in the foreign policy establishment of the time, such as Joaquim Nabuco, Salvador de Mendoça, and the Baron of Rio Branco -correctly identified the United States as a rising power and argued that the best way to increase Brazil's bargaining position vis-à-vis the major powers, while at the same time increasing its power resources and profile in the hemisphere, was to secure a position as a preferential partner of the United States in Latin America (HIRST, 2009a, pp. 20-25; PINHEIRO, 2004, pp. 14-16) 4 .
The Globalist paradigm became a real alternative to Americanism in Brazilian foreign policy circles in the 1950s. Its rise was connected with important changes both in Brazilian society and abroad. Rooted in the classic Realist tradition, Globalists argued that in an anarchic environment Brazil should pursue its own national interests as it deemed expedient, without tying itself up in any permanent partnerships (LIMA, 1994, pp. 27-46) . Moreover, Brazil should diversify its partners in order to broaden its policy space, gain leverage in Please see Cervo (2003) for a comprehensive discussion of the study of paradigms and its use as an analytical tool to understand and explain Brazilian foreign policy.
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Some authors point to the existence of two different approaches to the Americanist paradigm: the pragmatic approach, focussing on relationships seen as contributing to national development; and the ideological approach, highlighting the convergence of values and beliefs between the US and Brazil (the ideological similarities being considered more important than any potential outcome resulting from the partnership). Please see Lima (1994) , Pinheiro (2000 and 2004) , Ricúpero (1995) and Silva (1995) for a more detailed explanation of these approaches to the Americanist paradigm. international negotiations and boost its power capabilities, particularly in relation to the United States.
The Globalist paradigm was manifest, first and foremost, in the set of policies known as Brazil's Independent Foreign Policy (Política Externa Independente, PEI). This new understanding of Brazil's interests, autonomy and, ultimately, its foreign policy discourse, charted a theoretically neutral course for its foreign policy in relation not only to the bipolar West-East dispute during the Cold War, but also to the broader non-aligned movement, which Brazil did not join (SILVA, 1995, pp. 110-111) . At the same time, the PEI allowed Brazil to take a stance more in line with the new North-South dichotomy and rooted in social and development issues (HIRST, 2009a, p. 34) . This explains certain foreign policy positions that may seem puzzling or even contradictory, such as the diplomatic support that Brazil's right-wing military dictatorship gave, in the 1970s, to leftist Angolan liberation guerrillas fighting in the war of independence against Portugal.
The 1990s brought yet another paradigm change in Brazilian foreign policy. Economic crisis, combined with the political problems that culminated in the impeachment of President Fernando Collor de Mello in 1992, led to the collapse of both Americanism and Globalism, which had alternated as the mainstays of Brazilian foreign policy for almost a century (HIRST, 2009b; PINHEIRO, 2004, pp. 56-57; SARAIVA and VALENÇA, 2011, pp. 104) . Furthermore, Brazil's redemocratisation in the 1980s paved the way for new civil society actors to participate in foreign policy formulation, affecting traditional decision-making processes and broadening views and perspectives inside the Brazilian government.
Vice-president Itamar Franco, who replaced Collor de Mello, made the Mercosur and achieving regional leadership his foreign policy priorities (BURGES, 2008; VÁZQUEZ and RUIZ, 2009, p. 34) . These choices laid the foundations for the two new paradigms still prevalent today: Pragmatic Institutionalism and Autonomism. They propose that Brazil should forge stronger bonds with its neighbours and that these partnerships will in turn help the country establish itself as a regional leader and inch closer to the main international decision-making circles. Instead of relying on self-sufficiency, as in the past, Brazil should work to establish its autonomy and build up its international stature by participating in international institutions and by building political and economic linkages with Latin America, the Global South and the broader international community (LAMPREIA, 1998; PINHEIRO, 2004, p. 77) .
Pragmatic Institutionalism was the main foreign policy paradigm during the two presidential terms of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) Brazil was thus able to strengthen its endeavour to gain autonomy while being seen as an active and responsible member of the international community (LAMPREIA, 1998; MALAMUD, 2011b, p. 06) .
The achievements of the Pragmatic Institutionalism paradigm allowed the administration of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003 Silva ( -2010 to make further efforts to project Brazil as a global player (LIMA, 2008) . The Autonomist paradigm maintained the strategies developed by Pragmatic Institutionalism (CERVO and BUENO, 2008, p. 492 ), but assumed a revisionist and more defensive stance, arguing that Brazil should look beyond South America and attempt to influence other countries in the Global South (GONÇALVES, 2011, p. 25; KOCHER, 2011, pp. 171-176) . This strategic shift has been facilitated by the international political and economic context of the past decade. The turbulence and changes of the period created some room for change in international institutions without completely disrupting the international order (ALMEIDA, 2008; LIMA, PINHEIRO and HIRST, 2010) , providing broader political space, which Brazil has used to improve its international standing.
It is interesting to note that the paradigms above not only share these two endeavours -for policy autonomy and a more substantial role for Brazil in the international system; they also reveal a lack of symmetry between the country's power capabilities and its international aspirations. Given Brazil's lack of hard power, the various paradigms have historically advocated foreign policy strategies (2014) 8 (3) 66 -94 that rely instead on bandwagoning with global or prominent powers (here, particularly the Americanist paradigm, in its many forms) on participating actively in international political organisations and other forums where Brazil could mitigate the importance of hard power capabilities while claiming to represent a different kind of leadership. The next section will discuss Brazil's reliance on soft power.
Soft power strategies: persuasion and consensus building
Although both of these foreign policy endeavours suggest that Brazilian policy-makers were historically concerned with power projection and accumulating hard power, Brazilian foreign policy has mostly been marked by the use of non-material components of power (HAMANN, 2012b, p. 72 ) and
particularly by strategies such as persuasion and consensus building (BURGES, 2008, pp. 65-66) . Accordingly, the concept of 'soft power' developed and systematised by Joseph Nye in the early 2000s offers a useful way to understand the strategies and motivations behind Brazilian foreign policy until the rise of the Autonomist paradigm, during the Lula da Silva administration.
Nye was careful to view power in context, since one cannot refer to power without considering the political context in which it is used. Soft power may have advantages and may be more effective in certain contexts, while 'hard power' -most commonly, but not exclusively, represented by military power -may not be completely fungible or transferable from one context to another (BALDWIN, 1979, pp. 165-166) . Moreover, soft power strategies may be less contested and less costly to those who use them, meaning they can be employed even by states lacking the means to acquire large militaries or sophisticated weaponry. Smaller countries may be more attractive to others for their culture or shared values, and can also be more nimble and effective in promoting them in international forums, since soft power can be managed through, and even amplified by, international institutions. Extrapolating on the concept, soft power can even be said to dilute the traditional trade-off between 'power' and 'plenty', as its strategies tend to draw on, and benefit from, economic growth and domestic programmes traditionally identified with 'plenty'. Unsurprisingly, the use of persuasion as a soft power strategy presupposes a shared understanding, on the part of the actors involved, of the identity and motivations of the state that is wielding that power. At a minimum, the states that are to be influenced by soft power strategies must accept that there is something desirable, or not entirely detrimental, about the proposals coming from (2014) 8 (3) 66 -94 the influencing state. In that regard, three historical and two recent factors have contributed to strengthening Brazil's soft power and its tradition as a noninterventionist power in Latin America and, more broadly, in the Global South (HAMANN, 2012b; KENKEL, 2013) .
The first historical factor is the series of treaties that Brazil's monarchy, and subsequently the young republic, signed with many of its neighbours to settle boundary disputes and establish its territory. As a consequence of these treaties, The next section will examine these initiatives: Brazil's bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC, its leadership in the MINUSTAH mission, the development of a nuclear submarine and the use of the BNDES development bank to promote Brazilian influence abroad. These initiatives are important as they mark a inflexion point in Brazilian foreign policy during the Lula and Rousseff administrations and have been promoted by Brazilian officials as crucial stepping stones in the quest for autonomy and recognition at the international level. They are also interconnected. Given the time and space constraints and the preliminary nature of our enquiry, we treat each initiative as a separate idiographic case study, as defined by Levy (2008, p. 02) . Therefore, the focus here is on interpretive and qualitative analysis with the goal of understanding each case better, but without intending to generalise or form broad hypotheses applicable across time and place.
Recent initiatives in Brazilian foreign policy
The Brazilian bid for a more prominent position on the UNSC is the reflection of a long-standing desire among Brazilian foreign policy elites (ARRAES, 2006; MALAMUD, 2011b, p. 09 In the light of these perceptions, it is not surprising that the Brazilian government has focused on acquiring and improving Brazil's hard power capabilities in recent years. These concerns have become pervasive in policymakers' official pronouncements and in government-sponsored documents and reports. Roberto Mangabeira Unger -a Brazilian intellectual and political theorist, who was a tenured professor at Harvard University before becoming
Minister for Strategic Affairs in the Lula administration -was quoted in 2008 by
Reuters/O Globo as saying that Brazil's National Defence Strategy (Estratégia Nacional de Defesa, END), designed to guide Brazilian policies with a view to national defence, might be seen by others as "the instrument of an arms race".
However, he also considered that, if that were the case, it was crucial to foster a debate in Brazilian society on the country's "ambitions" and the "sacrifices that are necessary to transform ambitions into reality" (Plano de defesa sofrerá críticas, prevê Mangabeira Unger, 7 Sept. 2008).
Taking their cue from the END and Minister Unger, Brazil's armed forces have pushed for more material and financial resources and new weapon systems.
A series of reports prepared by the Brazilian military, focusing on a range of programs for technological capacitation and reform, highlight the tension between the official soft power discourse and the country's hard power ambitions. For instance, in a recent report on a programme titled Braço Forte (Strong Arm), the Brazilian Army states that, as a short-term goal, the programme should lead to the development of hard power capabilities that would allow the Army to act as a deterrent to any potential threats in the region, as well as to "first-rank powers".
More interestingly, it also states clearly that the programme's medium-and longterm goals should be to help the Army enhance its "power projection" capabilities (PERI, 2009, p. 08 ).
The goal of being able to project power is also one of the Brazilian Navy's justifications for pursuing its nuclear submarine programme. Over the coming decade, Brazil aims to build four new diesel-electric propelled submarines, and one nuclear-powered submarine. France is transferring technology for the submarine hull, and Brazil will use its own technology for the nuclear reactor (MARTINS FILHO, 2012) . In very general terms, both Brazilian policymakers and journalists have pointed out that a nuclear submarine would be invaluable as a deterrent factor to protect the increasingly important offshore oil fields along Brazil's coasts (CAVAS, 2009; MARTINS FILHO, 2012, pp. 306-307; MONTEIRO and FERNANDES, 2009; RODRIGUES, 2009) The data compiled in Table 01 are from various different sources. They all refer to the total number of troops, police officers and civilians officially deployed by the Brazilian government. Although Brazil deployed more troops than any other country in UNEF, UNAVEM III, and UNMISET, Haiti was the first time the UNSC appointed it to command a peace operation, and Brazilian policymakers have considered it an opportunity to show that, due to its different approach to peacekeeping, Brazil is able to handle peace-keeping and international security tasks of greater magnitude and difficulty (FERREIRA, 2012) . The second factor relates closely to the first. Accepting a major role in MINUSTAH was seen as compatible with Brazil's role as a power in the South American region and in the Global South (MALAMUD, 2011b, pp. 19-20) . Due to the global powers' limited interest in MINUSTAH, Brazil stepped up and agreed to command the mission. Until then, save for the Suez Peninsula missions, Brazil had deployed troops only when it was clearly in the national interest or there were affinities with the host country (BRACEY, 2012, p. 316; KENKEL, 2013, p. 282 This understanding underpins the Brazilian Army's approach to fulfilling the mission mandate. The first stage of MINUSTAH did focus on security in order to allow the mission to act and move freely in Haiti. In tandem with the security measures, however, MINUSTAH also aimed to legitimise its presence in the country. Previous UN missions to Haiti had tried to create a secure environment to ensure peace and the return to normal of the country's political processes, but neglected the roots of the conflict or the socioeconomic dynamics that could spoil the outcomes of the intervention.
Even so, beneath the discourse and outward appearance of soft power, MINUSTAH also revealed a more traditional, power-politics side to Brazil's role in peacekeeping operations. Accordingly, the Brazilian presence in Haiti may be understood as a catalyst for change in the capabilities and doctrines of the armed forces (KAWAGUTI, 2006, pp. 130-132) . Moreover, the tactics employed in patrolling Haitian cities are being replicated in Brazilian cities, especially in important cities, such as Rio de Janeiro. For instance, the patrolling of Rio's favelas (2014) In view of its mission and objectives, the BNDES has focused, for most of its history, on financing investments in Brazilian companies operating in the domestic market. Since the early 1990s, however, it has also started to act as an can be seen as reflecting these markets' importance to Brazilian companies and industry. However, it can also be read in terms of the more traditional geopolitical concerns of competition, survival, strategic control of trade relations with partners, development of a strong industrial sector and economic power more broadly, as exemplified by traditional realist scholars (CARR, 2001, pp. 108, 113, 124-129; MORGENTHAU, 1978, pp. 120-128) Coutinho, briefly discussed this policy, arguing further that the bank was preparing to shift focus towards the pharmaceutical and information technology sectors, which he thought had most potential going forward (COUTINHO, 2013) .
Final Considerations
This article explores how Brazilian foreign policy adopts a discourse based on using soft power to achieve its long-term interests, but also emphasises political actions that assert the importance of hard power to consolidate its position in international politics. As a regional leader and candidate for a more prominent role in world politics, Brazil needs to balance carefully the two faces of power in order to be, at one and the same time, a legitimate representative of the Global South and a trusted ally of the North.
This tension is also closely related to another tension between the country's carefully cultivated identity as a non-interventionist multilateralist with deep roots on the Global South and its emerging aspirations to being the 'natural' leader of South America. The article points to possible explanations for these tensions. The changes in attitude, the new initiatives and the tensions discussed above show that Brazilian foreign policy is at a crossroads, representing a clash between different perceptions about its standing in the world. Brazil's newfound predominance has led policymakers to prepare the country for a larger role in world affairs -one in which great power and power politics rules are crucial and predominate. However, there is still strong reluctance on the part of foreign policy elites to abandon the traditional foreign policy stance and the old strategies of persuasion and consensus building.
Persuasion and consensus building, in this sense, reflect Brazil's attempt to be understood as a global power: they make for easier inclusion and acceptance in multilateral forums. Soft power, regarded as distinguishing Brazil from other global players, is felt to legitimise the country's actions, while enabling it to extend its area of influence beyond South America and establish Brazilian leadership over the Global South.
The four initiatives discussed corroborate such an argument. They show Brazil's efforts to be recognised as a global player and a regional leader and, at the same time, they highlight the tension existing between hard power and soft power in international politics. The argument goes that, even though official discourse glosses over the hard power dimension, there can be no engaging in politics and aspiring to a distinguished position unless that claim is supported in both dimensions.
As a result, the indecision and weakness perceived in Brazilian foreign policy, together with the tensions existing between discourse and practices and among different roles, can be understood as products of a readjustment in long-held perceptions about the country's identity. Brazil has been playing a complicated balancing act, attempting to reconcile its bid to become a consensual leader in South America and play its role as a legitimate representative of the Global South, while jockeying for a seat among greater powers. The projects presented here are commensurate with the country's ambitions, and send mixed signals to its South American neighbours.
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